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DISCUSSION*
James L. Magavernt: In spite of Mr. Elliot's remarks, it is
important to recognize the legitimately political nature of many of
the kinds of decisions that are entailed in budgeting and the
importance of local self government. My remarks, and I think
the comptroller's position in this whole tangle of issues, are derived
from a concern not only with the issuance of debt instruments, as
important as that is, but with a more general need for financial
integrity and accountability in government. Budgeting is important
to provide accountability not only in a strict financial sense, but in
a much broader political sense. One of the great challenges to government today at all levels is to make the decision-making process
accessible and understandable to the people so that the elected
officials can be held responsible. One of the sources of erosion of
confidence in government is the financial gimmickry indulged in by
just about every level of government not least of all by the State of
New York.
A key objective of the City Bar Association's project (in fact, it
may be the fundamental objective) is to assure a balanced budget.
The Bar proposes a constitutional requirement that budgets be balanced. (I note in passing that the proposed statute provides some
lenience which is not expressed by the constitutional provision. The
constitutional provision should be qualified so as not to leave us
with a statute at variance with the language of the constitutional
provision.) A legal requirement already exists for balanced budgets
in both state and local government. The problem is not an absence
of legal principle; rather, the problem lies in enforcing it and in the
ingeniousness with which people can find means to evade legal requirements. The principal means of evasion appears to be faulty
revenue estimates, faulty estimates of mandatory expenditures
which are made whether or not they are appropriated, and the rollover technique, deferring obligations to another year. The remedies
*
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proposed by the project is to mandate disclosure and to establish the
comptroller as a monitor of local budgeting and ongoing financial
operations.
Before turning to a specific proposal I wish to advance, let me
tell you in a very tentative way what I think is presently going on
in the comptroller's department. We have a disclosure bill which
has been criticized today as inadequate. In part, I think this criticism ignores the fact that there are other things going on (or may
be going on) that will fill some of the other needs. One idea being
considered may be called a "budget bill." This budget bill would
be a mechanical approach of limiting revenue estimates to the
amount of revenues collected in a prior year with some possible
adjustment. New York City, I understand, had such provisions, but
they were dropped. Had they been maintained, the problems that
did develop in New York City might have been averted. The proposed budget bill would be a self-executing mechanism. It would not
require a heavy intrusion of state administrative officials into local
affairs. Additionally, it has the benefit of simplicity.
Secondly, we are certainly moving toward generally accepted accounting principles. We should recognize, I think, that the need for
generally accepted accounting principles is probably much greater
at the state level than at the local level. I do not think the localities,
except when there is state complicity, have the freedom to move
cost and revenue items back and forth from one year to another. I
do not think they have the freedom to continue to accumulate an
ever-growing deficit.
At this point, a question occurs to me relating to Professor Burton's distinction between accounting and budgeting. Does the constitutional power and the statutory power of the comptroller to prescribe accounting systems and accounting methods entail the responsibility of the state and local governments to budget in accordance with those accounting systems? Is there such a distinction
between accounting and budgeting? If the law prescribes an accounting system and balanced budget, is there an implication that
the budget must be balanced not only on a cash basis but also
in accordance with the accounting methods that have been
prescribed?
Finally, as to monitoring, the Department of Audit and Control
is moving toward much greater emphasis on general financial evalu-
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ation of communities, particularly troubled ones. Progress has been
made in developing a computerized capability for providing early
warning and for analyzing problems as they emerge, enabling the
comptroller to provide constructive advice to the localities in dealing with problems as they emerge. Admittedly, we are a long Way
from anything that could be considered satisfactory, but we are
certainly moving in the right direction. We have deemphasized the
old-post audit function used to discover misuse of public funds. I
do not want to diminish the importance of that, though. Even
though the audit may be five years late, the fact that there will be
an audit is important. Nevertheless, the emphasis should be, and
I think is, toward ongoing financial evaluation.
I would like to propose an alternative to the injection of the comptroller into the primary role of the fiscal monitor. Our goal is both
to make the monitoring effective at a much earlier stage in the
budgeting process and to design an effective means of enhancing the
accountability of local government to its own citizens. We should
look for a way to build a monitoring and disclosing process into the
local budget-making process itself. We should not allow the budget
to be made and then come in afterwards and say, "Well, here is a
problem, there is a problem." First, that is too late. Second, it does
not serve the purpose of enhancing accountability for local selfgovernment.
The alternative that I propose is to require an ongoing financial
review process in local government by a financial advisory committee comprised of people motivated to maintain their own professional standards. This committee would review, on a quarterly
basis, not only current budgetary accounts, but also an outline
budget for the following year. There would be a continuing review
for two years into the future. The committee would be looking not
only at what is happening within the current fiscal year but also to
what is going to happen in the following year. The official would be
required to submit not only an executive budget, but also a proposed outline budget for the following year which would deal with
major accounts and major revenue estimates. When the official releases the executive or tentative budget it would have to be simultaneously released to this committee. The committee, already established, would be familiar with the conditions of the community and
its government and would be able to respond quickly. The commit-
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tee could report within a very short period of time whether the
proposed new budget appears to be in balance and would identify
those areas of difficulty or potential imbalance. This report would
then be available to the public. The executive could use this report
in' making up the final budget. It would be available to the legislature when it acts on the budget and it would focus public attention
upon both the executive role and the legislative role. It would constitute a deterrent to gimmickry on the part of either the executive or
the legislature. If the voters still want to put up with the gimmickry,
well, that may be a price of democracy.
I do not mean that there should not be alternative remedies. The
state does have an interest in the integrity of local finances. If things
really get bad the state should be able to step in. I believe, however,
that the responsibility should be focused on the decision-making
processes at the local level. Thank you.
James A. Brigham, Jr.: I'd like to confine my remarks to the
balanced budget requirement. It is a requirement that the City
strongly endorses. We also feel that public officials must be held
accountable, both for their prospective judgment in the sense of
adopting a balanced budget that meets certain standards, and in
their actual performance, which means reporting on the results of
the budget after the close of the fiscal year.
The key question in my mind is, what are the standards? I feel
quite uncomfortable about the provision in the recommendatioris of
the committee that the state comptroller establish those standards.
First of all, the comptroller appropriately is operating in a political environment, but if we are talking about true accountability the
standards of local government budgeting and reporting ought to be
divorced from that political environment. I would suggest that having the comptroller establish the accounting principles does not do
justice to the requirements of accountability. Indeed, if the city
were to follow the state's accounting and budgeting practices, I
would probably end up in jail.
I would like to relate an example of the difficulties that the City
and other localities could be faced with if the standard of generally
accepted accounting principles is not followed. The audit by Peat,
Marwick and Mitchell of the city's 1978 financial statements resulted in recognition by the city of about 144 million dollars in
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revenues and expenditures in fiscal 1979 that were at variance with
the accounting for those items proposed by the state comptroller.
These issues had been reviewed by the city's independent accountant as well as by the Control Board and approved by those bodies.
The Special Deputy Comptroller suggested that the City should
account for the items differently. Without getting into the merits of
the issues, the net result of that would have been that in the middle
of the year the City would have been forced to cut 144 million dollars
out of its operating expenses, which would have been incredibly
disruptive to the operation of the government.
The Control Board, in its wisdom, did not recognize the suggested
changes in accounting and so the city did not have to cut those
expenses. But I would suggest that the committee consider establishing the standard for balanced budget as generally accepted accounting principles. I would also suggest that the comptroller might
be permitted to allow exceptions to generally accepted accounting
principles, but only with justification and only for a limited period
of time.
However, I do not think that the comptroller should be able to
mandate an exception to generally accepted accounting principles.
And, indeed, if a municipality has an independent audit, I believe
that the accounting determination of its auditor should prevail.
Thank you.
John C. Bender: There are a couple of specific issues that I want
to address concerning the comments on the committee's report. The
first one is an issue noted by Don Robinson raising the question,
whether procedures other than those used for debt issuance should
be instituted to monitor and to supervise local fiscal practices. We
spent a good deal of time in the committee and the subcommittee
level debating whether or not some sort of local or fiscal practices
board should be instituted, and whether or not that would be an
appropriate form of regulation given the New York City history, the
Yonkers history and some of the experiences of New York State
during the last few years.
After a fair amount of discussion on the issue, the committee
decided that the flexibility that had already been evidenced by the
different approaches taken to these problems in different places was
an important part of New York State's response. Additionally, the
need to defer to home-rule and to local responsibility was an impor-

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

tant part of the committee's recommendations.
The wisdom and usefulness of this approach, can be seen in the
different approaches taken toward budget regulation and monitoring in New York State over the last few years. In 1975, statutes
establishing control boards for New York City and Yonkers were
nearly identical. Subsequently, statutory restrictions were imposed
on budget increases for Yonkers with a fiscal agent exercising certain supervisory authority. This shows the need to maintain some
flexibility in establishing monitoring mechanisms.
The second point I wish to make relates to Jim Magavern's proposal of a budget bill. The bill was described as a simple and
straightforward approach to regulating local budgetary practices
and towards eliminating much of the bureaucratic establishment
that would be necessary for ongoing budget review. As I gather, this
is somewhat comparable to the Yonkers situation where revenue
estimates for prior years collections are limited. The difficulty with
this approach is that it is inherently conservative; unless a review
of revenue estimates is allowed circumstances in which it is perfectly appropriate to increase the amount of projected revenues will
be ignored. There is no way to do that unless you have some review
of budget decisions and some exercise of judgment in connection
with them. That leads you, of course, back into a fairly elaborate
bureaucratic mechanism, especially if you're going to do that on a
statewide basis.
The third point on which I wish to comment is the question of
whether or not generally accepted accounting principles can be used
as a budgeting standard or whether they are instead a reporting
standard. It is emphasized continually by people like Sandy Burton
that those are in fact reporting standards. The committee's proposal
also sees it as a reporting standard. That proposal requires a balanced budget, a budget the results of which, when reported in accordance with county standards promulgated by the comptroller,
which could be generally accepted accounting principles or any
other principles as may be necessary, do not result in a deficit.
Simply saying that you want a budget that's going to result in no
deficit when reported in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles does not solve the problem of budget administration or deciding whether or not the budget when presented at the
beginning of the year is balanced. For example, the prime budget
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for New York City, when presented to the Control Board for review
at the beginning of this year, contained a revenue item in it of 80
million dollars that was attributable to the sale of a right of way for
Westway. The accountants held that if those revenues were received
during the year they could be reported as a revenue in support of
expenditures in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles. Looking at that budget in the beginning of the year and
trying to determine whether or not it was balanced in accordance
with the statutory restrictions which involved generally accepted
accounting principles required a number of judgments about
whether or not the Westway revenues would be realized during the
year.
There is nothing in generally accepted accounting principles that
informs you about whether or not it is reasonable to assume that all
of the procedures necessary to the realization of those Westway
revenues would be completed during the course of the year. For
example, generally accepted accounting principles would not require state and local authorities to approve or disapprove of Westway before anticipated revenues from Westway could be included
in the proposed budget.
As the fiscal year progressed, we decided that the budget was
balanced when it included that Westway revenue. Six months later
we made a different judgment about whether or not that Westway
revenue could be included. There were different factors affecting our
judgment. We had gone through six months. There wasn't much
progress on the Westway hearings and it was less likely at that point
that the revenues would in fact be realized by the end of the fiscal
year and would be available for inclusion in the budget. At that
point it was no longer appropriate to say that a budget that includes
that Westway revenue was "balanced in accordance with those
standards." We exercised a good deal of judgment and discretion
during that time. This is essentially the point raised by Sandy Burton; that is, generally accepted accounting principles will solve all
of the issues. They really do not. There are a lot of very complex
issues remaining that require the exercise of a good deal of judgment
and discretion during the course of a budget review.
Finally, the question whether the state ought to exert its powers
and assume responsibility for something more than the course of
debt issuance, or accept responsibility for fiscal practices other than
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in connection with debt issuance, I think raises some other interesting problems. Most of the discussion here has focused on a balanced
budget as being the one factor that indicates fiscal stability and
fiscal health. That just is not so. A balanced budget is the last stop.
It's the bottom line. There are lots of other indications of fiscal
health and lots of other ways to monitor the relative fiscal health of
municipalities. To the extent that we are talking about the state
asserting responsibility for monitoring the fiscal practices and the
fiscal health of the communities, we might talk about it monitoring
something much more elaborate than balanced budgets. We might
talk about monitoring taxes per capita, debt per capita, operating
expenses per capita. Those are some of the factors that were identified in the report that was recently published by Touche Ross & Co.
and First National Bank of Boston.

It seems to me that in order for the state to assume such responsibility we have got to take a much more ambitious approach than
simply requiring a balanced budget. It would be the state's responsibility to look at economic, social or structural conditions affecting
the fiscal health of municipalities. To realize the balanced budget
the state must take responsibility at some earlier point and take a
look at the extent to which taxing practices, external economic
events or trends are affecting the local fiscal health and perhaps
intervene at a somewhat earlier point than the balanced budget test
would permit. Thank you.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Evan A. Davis: I would like to talk for just a minute about the
constitutional questions, particularly about debt and tax limits.
We are here today in large degree because over a ten-year period
the City of New York ran up a cumulative operating deficit of between six and seven billion dollars. It issued large amounts of shortterm debt which were continuously rolled over until a point came
where the process could not be continued and the city faced a crisis,
the state faced a crisis, the authorities that operate within the state
faced a crisis, and in many ways, the national government faced a
crisis.
The city and state followed this policy of deficit financing without violating the constitution. Indeed, the only part of the process
that violated the constitution was the moratorium declared on the
payment of short-term city notes after the fiscal crisis struck. Jim
Magavern said earlier that at the heart of many of the committee's
proposals is a desired response to this deficit financing problem. I
think that is accurate. I think that is true of our budget proposal,
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constitutional proposals and disclosure proposal. Disclosure is
something that will bring early warning of this kind of problem not
only to investors and the market, but also to voters and the news
media.
Debt limits and tax limits relate to the deficit financing question.
Existing debt limits for local governments are presently quite meaningless. Additionally, MAC bonds issued to support the cumulative
deficit of the City of New York have no impact on the City debt
limit and is subject only to a statutory authorization notwithstanding that it is debt that future generations of New York City taxpayers are going to pay.
The existing local finance article says nothing about short-term
debt. The legislature could and did do what it wanted to do in the
area. I think the committee feels that whatever may be the merits
of the issue of a balanced budget at the federal level or at the state
level, there is a need to mandate that local government live within
its means. This mandate helps contain the cost of government and
provides incentives for professionalism, for efficiency and for productive governmental service.
There are crises. There will be temporary exceptions from time to
time, but the policy of the state should be against deficit financing
in order to provide local governments with an incentive to operate
efficiently. An inclusive debt limit that includes consideration of
short-term debt will help to enforce this concept of living within
your means.
We on the committee have gone a long way towards simplification
of the constitution, and have done some very controversial things. I
would say that our proposals when they were advanced in Cornell,
where there was a larger percentage of people from areas other than
New York City than are present today, encountered rough sledding
on the simplification issue. Outside of the city there is resistance
to any change in the debt limit and to any change in the tax limit.
Obviously this resistance is heightened by the temper of our times
which emphasizes cutting back government expenditure, a balanced federal budget, and measures like California's Proposition 13.
The committee approached these problems like lawyers. We
wanted to suggest constitutional provisions that make sense, that
are workable, and that set coherent policies. We therefore did not
want to continue with a debt limit that has become meaningless.
Nor did we want to continue with a "gift and loan" provision that
is circumvented by creating an authority every time the private
sector fails. Sometimes the proper way is to provide creatively for
cooperation between public and private sectors. The existing principle in the constitution forces the creation of authorities, even though
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the public has shown resistance to the use of authorities over the
years.
The constitution's full faith and credit provision and first lien
provisions also serve a useful purpose. The one fiscal crisis device
that was declared unconstitutional, the moratorium, was based
upon these provisions. The moratorium decision had a positive impact on the credit of not only the state but also on the credit of the
localities and authorities operating within the state. Courts will,
and must, exercise certain equitable discretion in enforcing any
provision which has as its underlying thought the principle that
debt must be paid. Judge Breitel's opinion in Flushing National
Bank was important for the reason that the city was thereby forced
to pay its debt.
I think those provisions are useful. I think they do support the
credit of local government and I think you have to have them so that
in times of trouble there will be additional legal support to allow the
public sale of debt.
As Ed Kresky notes, this is a long process, and I have come to
realize the truth of that quite clearly. But we have made some
progress. We have had this conference and the conference at Cornell. Interested state officials have read our report and have it under
study. This process should go forward. It is the hope of the committee that a statewide commission, not only of lawyers and accountants, but of thoughtful citizens can be established.
Finally, a few general comments. One thing I want to do in particular is to recognize George Dwight who was the chairman of the
Municipal Affairs Committee during the entire year that we were
putting this report together. It was George who kept us all going and
kept us on schedule and raised all the money and really made it
possible. So we owe a great debt of gratitude to him and I'm glad
he was able to come today.
I want to give a little progress report on where our proposals
stand. You heard this morning about the disclosure legislation that
is being introduced by the comptroller's office. My own view is that
this is a very large step toward the goals that the committee had in
mind. In a competitive bid offering, where the underwriters do not
participate directly in the preparation of the document, there is a
particular need for regularizing the disclosure process. On the other
hand, there is resistance on the part of some localities to doing this.
When we went up to Cornell we heard about it in great detail from
the representatives of organizations of counties, towns and villages.
I think the important thing is to start the process. Get people in the
habit, get them moving.
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I think the comptroller's bill is going to get people moving. I think
there probably are other steps to be taken and to some extent the
comptroller's office has existing power with regard to accounting
standards and this power is being used to move localities along. I
am hopeful that the comptroller's bill will pass. I think this is something to be done right away. The legislature has debated this thing
for three years now. Two governor's bills, one prior comptroller's
bill, a new comptroller's bill, and our report have contributed to the
debate. I think it is time for them to get along and adopt something
and get New York State committed as a matter of state policy to
full disclosure by local government.
The constitutional reform is going to involve a longer debate.
There was not unanimity of viewpoint within the committee. There
is no unanimity of viewpoint within the state. We hope constitutional proposals will be introduced in the state legislature in the
next couple of weeks. As I noted before, we urge the creation of a
temporary state commission to continue our investigation. I hope
that many of the people here could participate in the work of such
a temporary state commission, because I think that the kinds of
viewpoint and kinds of comments that have been made today would
be very useful to furthering this work.
Thanks again to Professor Harper, the Fordham Urban Law Journal and Fordham Law School for holding this symposium on our
report. I thank particularly the extremely distinguished panelists
and members of the audience who have taken the time to write these
papers and prepare these comments and make all these useful and'
helpful suggestions. Thank you very much.

